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Abstract. The nonlethal effects of wildlife tourism can threaten the conservation status
of targeted animal populations. In turn, such resource depletion can compromise the
economic viability of the industry. Therefore, wildlife tourism exploits resources that can
become common pool and that should be managed accordingly. We used a simulation
approach to test whether different management regimes (tax, tax and subsidy, cap, cap and
trade) could provide socioecologically sustainable solutions. Such schemes are sensitive to
errors in estimated management targets. We determined the sensitivity of each scenario to
various realistic uncertainties in management implementation and in our knowledge of the
population. Scenarios where time quotas were enforced using a tax and subsidy approach, or
they were traded between operators were more likely to be sustainable. Importantly,
sustainability could be achieved even when operators were assumed to make simple rational
economic decisions. We suggest that a combination of the two regimes might offer a robust
solution, especially on a small spatial scale and under the control of a self-organized,
operator-level institution. Our simulation platform could be parameterized to mimic local
conditions and provide a test bed for experimenting different governance solutions in speciﬁc
case studies.
Key words: common pool resource; management error; management regimes; overexploitation;
socioecological simulations; wildlife tourism.
INTRODUCTION
Natural resources can often be treated as common-
pool resources, in that they are subtractable (i.e., one’s
usage reduces the amount available to others) and non-
excludable (i.e., accessible to everyone; Ostrom 1990).
When unmanaged, these resources are likely to become
depleted from overuse, i.e., the pursuit of one’s short-
term self-interest leads to long-term damages for all.
This is traditionally known as the tragedy of the
commons (Hardin 1968). An appropriate management
of the access and use of such goods can prevent the onset
of the tragedy (Ostrom 1990), but each management
solution has its own drawbacks and sensitivities (Ostrom
et al. 1999).
Wildlife tourism (see Plate 1) has been proposed as an
effective way to sustainably exploit wildlife, while
contemporaneously improving general public’s aware-
ness and attitude toward the natural world (Duffus and
Dearden 1990, Tisdell and Wilson 2002). The non-
consumptive use of animals is increasing fast (Reynolds
and Braithwaite 2001), especially at sea (e.g., O’Connor
et al. 2009), and is generally assumed to positively
contribute to addressing conservation issues (Higgin-
bottom and Tribe 2004). However, unregulated tourism
can impact animal populations (Reynolds and
Braithwaite 2001). Animals perceive tourism as a risk,
hence responding to such interactions with anti-preda-
tory tactics (Frid and Dill 2002). This can translate into
disruptions of their activity budget, spatial displace-
ment, and other sublethal effects that can lead to long-
term population consequences (Pirotta et al. 2014).
While originally a public good (accessible to everyone
[Moore and Rodger 2010], but not subtractable),
wildlife targeted by tourism can therefore become a
common-pool resource. Tour operators, who aim at
maximizing their present beneﬁt, make such resource
subtractable by exploiting it to a level at which
detrimental effects are instigated, compromising the
viability of the wildlife population and hence their future
payoffs (Briassoulis 2002, Moore and Rodger 2010).
Previous work has identiﬁed the required conditions for
a successful management of tourism activities, and
suggested that tourism does not necessarily lead to the
tragedy (Moore and Rodger 2010). However, we
currently do not have a framework to understand how
to navigate real world situations toward these sustain-
able conditions.
Wildlife tourism differs from other resource exploi-
tation industries, in that the operators’ income is
received before the resource is used. Proﬁt can be
maximized only through the reduction of costs and
the investment in visitors’ satisfaction, which can (but
not necessarily will) increase the chances of future
income (Higginbottom 2004). Moreover, the effects of
overexploitation on resource availability generally
operate on a longer timescale than the day-to-day
trips offered by tour operators (Cumming et al. 2006),
so that this resource stops being a public good and
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becomes a common-pool resource only when the
viability of the corresponding population starts
degrading. In addition, differently from other systems
where the industry directly subtracts resource units,
the impacts of wildlife tourism occur at the level of
the relation between resource units and the overall
system. By overconsuming the time spent with the
animals, tourism can affect the natural behavior of the
animals and therefore compromise their survival or
reproductive rates, which could ultimately damage
population dynamics (New et al. 2014) and reduce the
availability of animals for encounters during tours.
This, together with the fact that animals move and
need to be kept free, also means that ownership of the
resource units is not justiﬁed as in other systems and
tour operators could solely own the time to spend
with the animals, which can only be indirectly
depleted.
Because of this complexity, it is difﬁcult to predict
operators’ behavior as the result of the optimization of
simple rules. A simulation approach offers the possibil-
ity to investigate the efﬁcacy of different governance
solutions, while realistically reproducing the stochastic-
ity intrinsic in such industry. Through simulations, the
gradient of outcomes of each management scenario can
be explored to pinpoint the variables (and their
interactions) that most contribute to its success or
failure (Agrawal 2003). Decision makers rarely have all
needed facts to make accurate decisions. This uncer-
tainty can affect the outcome of management actions,
yet we do not have an evaluation of this effect (Dietz et
al. 2003). Conversely, identifying generalities and
uncertainties is often difﬁcult using empirical case
studies because of the complex interaction between
confounding factors. Simulations can also be used to
anticipate low probability but high risk outcomes (Dietz
et al. 2003).
In this study, we use a simulation approach to
evaluate the relative performance of different sets of
boundary rules (or policy instruments) in managing
wildlife tourism sustainability. We develop a dynam-
ical socioecological simulation framework to assess
the effects of these management regimes on a wildlife
population targeted by nonconsumptive tourism. Our
framework simpliﬁes both the economic model for
tourism and the exploitation model for the natural
resource, because we aimed at describing the poorly
understood interaction between these two compo-
nents. We investigate under which socioecological
conditions each management regime leads to the
wildlife population being sustained and the industry
remaining viable.
METHODS
Wildlife population
We assumed that a wildlife population occupied a 50
3 50 km grid of 2500 cells. To simulate a random
distribution of animals in space, we generated a spatially
correlated random ﬁeld with an exponential variogram
and subsequent kriging (library gstat in R 13.01 [R
Development Core Team 2013]; Appendix B: Fig. B1).
We varied environmental complexity using the sill and
range parameters of the variogram, and used the inverse
logit of the random ﬁeld to deﬁne the probability of
wildlife encounter in each cell i ( pi ). The mean of the
kriged surface (hereafter kriged mean) determined the
mean probability of encountering the animals across the
grid, i.e., kriged mean¼ logit(mean( pi )). We then used a
binary draw in each cell using pi to generate daily animal
distributions.
Tour operators
Operators started their trips from randomly allocated
boundary cells, which were ﬁxed for all trips. We
assumed a total of 10 tourist operators working in the
area. Each operator offered one trip per day, lasting 1.5
h, charging £15/person. Each trip could accommodate a
maximum of 20 tourists. Daily trips were simulated as
biased random walks updated every 3 minutes (Fig. 1a).
During the ﬁrst 60 minutes, the trip was directed toward
the center of the grid, although this attraction progres-
sively decreased with time. The coordinates of an
operator’s position at time step t were
Xt ¼ Xt1 þ step3 cosðqÞ and Yt ¼ Yt1 þ step3 sinðqÞ
ð1Þ
where q ; wrapped Cauchy(lt, qt). The wrapped
Cauchy is a circular distribution often used for turning
angles in biased random walks (e.g., Morales et al.
2004). The parameter lt was the angle between the x-
axis and the line joining the current position and the
center of the grid and qt regulated path directedness (it
was inversely related to time, qt¼ time0.3; this simulated
an exponential decrease in attraction toward the center
of the grid with time (0.3 was chosen based on observed
realizations of the random walks). Step length was ﬁxed
to 1.4 km per 3-minute time step (i.e., 28 km/h). After 60
minutes, the process changed, and the biased random
walk was directed toward the starting point. Directed-
ness exponentially increased as time passed. When the 90
minutes elapsed, the operator returned to its starting
location.
During a trip, an encounter occurred whenever an
operator found itself in a cell where, on that day, some
animals were present. The proportion of the trip spent
with animals inﬂuenced tourists’ satisfaction (Tisdell
and Wilson 2002 and Fig. 1b). Operators decided on
encounter duration depending on the number of
encounters in the previous day and the desired total
time with animals on each day, which was driven by
customer satisfaction (tuned here so that 45 minutes
corresponded to 0.95 tourists’ satisfaction). Encounter
duration was drawn from a Weibull distribution with
shape ¼ 10 and scale ¼ 45/nd1, where nd1 was the
number of encounters in the previous day. We also
simulated animals having more control on their
ENRICO PIROTTA AND DAVID LUSSEAU730 Ecological Applications
Vol. 25, No. 3
interactions with tourism, i.e., encounter duration was
drawn from a Weibull distribution with ﬁxed scale ¼
20.
Tourists and proﬁt
The number of visitors per operator on each day
depended on customer satisfaction in the previous day
(i.e., a binomial draw using the maximum number of
visitors per trip and the value of satisfaction between 0
and 1). If there were no visitors, the operator did not run
the trip. We used a simple microeconomic model in
which annual proﬁts depended solely on income and
running costs
profito;y ¼ visitorso;y3 ticket timeouto;y3 fuel ð2Þ
where visitorso,y was the number of visitors in year y per
operator o, ticket was ticket price, timeouto,y was the sum
of the duration of the trips performed by operator o in
year y, and fuel was fuel cost per unit of time (0.7 £/min).
FIG. 1. Visualization of simulation settings. (a) Example of a daily run of the simulation on the spatial grid. The parameters
used to deﬁne the surface of wildlife distribution were sill¼ 0.01 and range¼ 0.1. The small dots are the grid cell centers, the lines
are the tracks of the operators’ trips and the circles represent animal locations on that day. (b) Sigmoid relationship between the
proportion of time spent with the animals during a trip and tourists’ satisfaction (a unitless measure ranging between 0 [completely
unsatisﬁed] and 1 [completely satisﬁed]). (c) Sigmoid relationship between total animal exposure to tourism in a year and effect on
the mean probability of encounter across the grid (as expressed in Eq. 4). Each line corresponds to a different value of max, i.e., the
total amount of time above which there starts to be a relevant effect on the population.
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Wildlife use
The annual growth rate of the wildlife population was
1%, but this was affected by tourism exposure
effecty ¼ 0:1 0:1=

1þ exp

slopey3
X
o
withanimalso;y
ðmaxy þmaxy=5Þ

ð3Þ
where withanimalso,y was the amount of time spent with
the animals by operator o in year y, maxy represented
the total amount of time spent with animals above which
there started to be a relevant effect on the population,
and slopey regulated the yearly steepness of the effect
(Fig. 1c). The scaling term maxy/5 was included to
ensure that the effect only started after the amount of
time spent with animals was greater than maxy. Tourism
exposure affected the area homogeneously. Therefore,
the probability of encountering wildlife in cell i, pi,y,
changed every year y depending on tourism exposure in
the previous year
pi;y ¼ pi;y13ðk effecty1Þ ð4Þ
where k reﬂected the annual growth rate of the
population (1.01).
As population density changed, the number of
animals supporting tourism also varied. The effect of
tourism on the population trajectory is mediated by
individual cumulative exposure to tourism (Pirotta et al.
2014). Therefore, we varied maxy and slopey with the
effective population growth rate to account for changes
in per capita exposure resulting from changes in density
maxy ¼ maxy13ðk effecty1Þ and slopey ¼ 25=maxy:
ð5Þ
Slopey depended on maxy since we expected bigger
populations to show a slower response to added
disturbance. The relationship between the two parameters
was calibrated by visually inspecting the resulting curve.
We assumed the absence of any density-dependent
effects on population dynamics. However, the system
did have a carrying capacity (
P
i pi,y ¼ 2500).
Exploitation strategy
Given an even allocation of exposure, an operator had
maxy/10 amount of time to spend with the animals
before it started contributing to the overexploitation of
this resource. An operator would set a daily limit of time
with animals (maxy/10/365), above which any subse-
quent encounter on that day had duration equal to 0.
Defection and cooperation
A cooperator was deﬁned as an operator that respected
its yearly time allowance, while a defector spent more
time with animals than it was entitled to. Cooperators
and defectors were randomly identiﬁed by drawing a
ﬁxed proportion of defecting operators at the start of the
simulation (0.1, 0.2, or 0.5). The behavior of operators
could then evolve across years in two different ways.
Fixed proportion.—The proportion of defectors did
not change within a given year. At the end of year y, the
operators were more likely to adopt the most successful
behavior for year y þ 1, depending on mean proﬁt of
defectors and cooperators. Cooperation prevailed de-
terministically when cooperators’ proﬁt was higher, but
we also investigated what happened when cooperation
arose from a stochastic draw.
Tit-for-tat.—The operators daily updated their behav-
ior on the basis of the behavior of others. The behavior in
year y þ 1 arose from a binary draw with probability
equal to the proportion of defectors in year y.
In both cases, operators needed to know the behavior
of others, but an operator’s knowledge is not necessarily
complete. Hence, we contrasted outcomes depending on
whether operators only knew their neighbors’ behavior,
or they could be informed about the behavior of all
operators. In a global knowledge scenario, the proﬁt of
defectors and cooperators was evaluated on the entire
grid, in a local knowledge scenario only the operators
within a radius of 15 km from an operator’s starting
location inﬂuenced its behavior.
Management regimes
We simulated ﬁve different management regimes
deﬁned by a set of boundary rules (or policy instru-
ments) that regulated access to wildlife (Sterner 2003).
1. Open-access.—We tested what happened to the
industry and the wildlife population when there was no
enforcement of time quotas. Operators were aware of the
amount of time they could spend with the animals before
contributing to overexploitation, and could decide wheth-
er to respect that quota or defect at no cost. This assumed
that the maximum time available with animals before any
detrimental effect was known without error. To test the
sensitivity of the outcome to the precision of this quota, we
simulated a situation where this time was estimated with
increasing error (1–70% error). In the real world, operators
are likely to sell a consistently unproﬁtable business.
Therefore, we also simulated a situation in which, if an
operator’s income was negative and had been negative for
the previous three years, it would retire from the industry
and its quota would be distributed between the remaining
operators.
2. Tax (or ﬁne).—This scenario simulated the ex-
istence of a managing institution that enforced the time
quotas by imposing a ﬁne to defecting operators at the
end of each year. The ﬁne reduced a defector’s yearly
proﬁt, and hence discouraged defection. The ﬁne was
proportional to the amount of extra time that each
operator spent with animals above its allocated quota.
This time is unlikely to be known without error by the
institution. We therefore simulated the effect of an
increasing error of the institution’s evaluation of an
operator’s extra time by drawing a value in minutes
from a Weibull distribution with shape¼ 1 and scale¼
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1000, 2000, or 5000 (small, medium, and large error),
which was subtracted from the operator’s extra time.
We also tested the effect of a delay in the assessment of
the population size and the corresponding safe expo-
sure levels. We assumed that a density survey was
carried out every 5, 10, or 20 years and management
only updated on those years.
3. Tax and subsidy.—In this scenario, the operators
contributed £10 000/year to pay for a third party to
enforce regulation upon them. The revenue from the
annual ﬁnes to defectors was then distributed between
cooperating operators. We tested the inﬂuence of errors
in the enforcer’s evaluation of operators’ behavior, in
the same way as we did for the tax regime.
4. Cap.—The operators were not allocated individual
quotas, but the managing institution tallied up the
overall time spent by all operators with animals. When
maxy time was reached, the institution stopped any
activity on that year, and no one was allowed to carry
out any more trips. In addition, we simulated the error
of operators in reporting the time spent with animals on
each day. Such error (in minutes) was drawn from a
Weibull distribution with shape¼ 1 and scale¼ 1, 5, 10
(small, medium, and large error).
5. Cap and trade (individual transferrable quotas).—
In this scenario, the operators were allocated individual
quotas of maxy that they could trade with others for a
monetary compensation (15 £/min). At the start of the
simulation, each operator had the same quota. When an
operator’s cumulative proﬁt was £50 000 in excess to its
proﬁt in year 1, that operator was willing to buy extra
time shares. Conversely, if an operator’s proﬁt on a given
year was less than £10 000, the operator wanted to sell
part of its shares. In an intermediate situation, an
operator did not buy, but could sell if somebody was
interested in buying (half of the times, on average). When
the remaining quota owned by an operator was less than
1000 minutes per year, the operator liquidated its shares
and retired from the business. Unaccounted processes
affecting trade (e.g., willingness to sell part of the quota
but not all) were simulated by introducing some
stochasticity in the amount of quota that was bought
and sold. Importantly, trade was assumed to happen
before an operator decided on whether to defect or
cooperate. The opposite scenario was also investigated.
Each scenario was run for 100 years and for different
combinations of other conditions (Appendix A: Table
A1). The dynamics of the population and the industry,
the trend in customer satisfaction, and the behavior of
operators were monitored at each year. We ran
scenarios that appeared to be sensitive to stochasticity
10 times, to capture these stochastic effects.
Environment
We investigated the effects of the environment on the
outcome of our simulations by re-running the open
access scenario under 27 different combinations of sill,
range, and kriged mean parameters. Each parameter
could take one of three possible values (0.01, 0.1, and 1
for sill; 0.1, 5, 50 for range; logit(0.01), logit(0.1),
logit(0.3) for kriged mean). Relevant parameter combi-
nations were then used to assess the performance of
different management regimes under heterogeneous
environmental conditions.
RESULTS
Open access
Unsurprisingly, defection rapidly spread between the
operators in an open-access scenario, since it led to
greater annual proﬁts (Fig. 2a). This resulted in the
resource being overexploited, i.e., the targeted wildlife
population being extirpated in less than 50 years (Fig.
4a). Consequently, tourism was no longer viable in the
area (Fig. 3a). When the operators were allowed to retire
from the industry, they did so in less than 30 years. Left
undisturbed, the population could then recover from its
depletion state (Appendix C: Fig. C1).
When operators followed a tit-for-tat approach,
defection could stochastically disappear, which guaran-
teed a sustainable and proﬁtable industry, but this
became progressively less likely as the initial proportion
of defectors increased. When there were no defectors,
but the maximum allowed exposure before causing an
impact was estimated with error, the system showed
some resilience. Speciﬁcally, an overestimation of the
maximum exposure by 30% still allowed the industry
and the population to thrive, but they both collapsed
with a 40% error.
If the animals had some control on the duration of
each encounter (i.e., the Weibull distribution for
encounter duration had ﬁxed scale ¼ 20; see Methods:
Tour operators), the spread of defection between the
operators did not lead to a complete collapse. The
population declined and stabilized, which caused the
operators’ annual proﬁt to also stabilize at lower values.
The population and the industry oscillated around a
stable state and the operators’ annual proﬁts were
always positive.
In a local knowledge scenario, cooperation and
defection stabilized at a ﬁxed proportion, which varied
stochastically depending on the spatial arrangement of
the operators and their relative distance. This scenario
could cope with some defectors (ﬁnal proportion  0.4;
Appendix D: Fig. D1). The initial proportion of defectors
had some inﬂuence on the ﬁnal proportion on which the
system stabilized, in that lower initial proportions were
more likely to stabilize into lower ﬁnal proportions.
The average probability of encountering the animals
across the grid affected the outcome of the simulations.
When animals were sparse, e.g., kriged mean ¼ log-
it(0.01), the operators could not encounter them often
enough to sustain a proﬁtable industry. This protected
the population from overexploitation and, while annual
proﬁts progressively increased, they never turned positive
in the 100 simulated years. The wildlife population’s
spatial assortment had comparably less inﬂuence on the
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system’s dynamics, except for situations in which there
was marked spatial heterogeneity in the distribution of
the resource (range¼ 5; sill¼ 1). This led to differences in
proﬁt between operators depending on where they were
located on the grid (Appendix E: Fig. E1). We used these
conditions to test the effect of environmental heteroge-
neity on other management regimes.
Tax
In a scenario where the industry was managed by an
institution imposing a ﬁne on defection without any error,
defection (starting at any initial proportion) was rapidly
overcome by cooperation because of the ﬁnes, whichmade
this behavior unproﬁtable (Figs. 2b, 3b). When coopera-
tion arose more stochastically following binary draws, it
did not always prevail, since the implemented ﬁne was not
large enough to act as a detractor. When there were errors
in management but these were small (Weibull scale
parameter¼ 1000) and the initial proportion of defectors
was low (0.1 or 0.2), cooperation prevailed, although after
a longer period. For larger errors or higher initial
proportions, defection overcame cooperation, and both
the industry and the population collapsed (Figs. 2b, 3b,
4b). Interestingly, for large errors (Weibull scale parameter
¼ 5000) and low initial proportions (0.1 or 0.2), after an
initial population decline, defection was overcome by
cooperation, and the system eventually recovered (Figs.
2b, 4b). This happened because the initial decline was so
FIG. 2. Simulated temporal trend in operators’ annual proﬁt under a selection of different management scenarios: (a) open
access, (b) tax, (c) tax and subsidy, (d) cap, (e) cap-and-trade, and combinations of parameters (indicated by the different line types
within each plot).
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dramatic that defection became evident to the institution
even with high management error. Because the initial
proportion was low, defection did not have time to spread.
The outcome of this management scenario remained
substantially unchanged when the environment was
heterogeneous, although there were differences in overall
performance between operators. A delay in the assessment
of the safe levels of exposure to tourismalso did not change
the results. In the absence of management errors, since the
population was increasing, such delay only translated into
more conservative limits. When there was an error in
enforcement, the population declined irrespectively of any
delay in management update.
Tax and subsidy
When cooperating operators received shares of the
ﬁnes imposed to defectors, the system was more resilient
to management errors. The reward for cooperating
increased the discrepancy in proﬁt from the defectors, so
that even at medium errors (Weibull scale parameter ¼
2000) and high initial proportion of defectors (0.5),
cooperation prevailed. Large errors (Weibull scale
parameter ¼ 5000) were still compensated if the initial
proportion of defectors was low (0.1; Figs. 2c, 3c, 4c). As
for the tax regime, the environment did not change these
outcomes, but different operators had markedly differ-
ent proﬁts depending on their location on the grid.
Cap
Management of the system with an overall cap above
which tourism activities were interrupted was successful
when there were no reporting errors by the operators.
This management solution did accommodate for small
errors, but already for medium errors (around 5 minutes
FIG. 3. Simulated temporal trend in operators’ cumulative proﬁt under a selection of different management scenarios: (a) open
access, (b) tax, (c) tax and subsidy, (d) cap, (e) cap-and-trade, and combinations of parameters (indicated by the different line types
within each plot).
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per operator per day), the industry was shut down with a
sufﬁcient delay to cause overexploitation, the animal
population’s collapse and the subsequent collapse of the
industry itself (Figs. 2d, 3d, 4d). The collapse was faster
when reporting error was large (Weibull scale parameter
¼ 10). As for the previous scenarios, there was no
substantial inﬂuence of the environmental conditions.
Cap and trade
When operators owned their share of the total quota,
and the choice of behavior was preceded by a possible
trade of these shares between operators, cooperation
could spread between the operators and overcome
defection (Figs. 2e, 3e, 4e). The number of remaining
operators (that had not sold out their entire quota) at
the end of the 100-year simulations varied, but
individual transferrable quotas only seldom led to a
monopoly of one or two operators. This pattern was
maintained when operators followed a tit-for-tat ap-
proach for their behavior. In this scenario, cooperation
spread through a ﬁxed mechanism. First, as a result of
overexploitation and consequent decline of the wildlife
population, some operators started to lose money and
were incentivized to sell their quota. The income they
obtained from these sales narrowed the discrepancy
between the mean proﬁt of cooperators and defectors,
and the choice of defection was thus not straightfor-
ward. Cooperators were more affected by wildlife
decline, but the sales of their quotas increased their
proﬁt, providing an alternative proﬁtable strategy. It
follows that if trade happened after an operator had
already chosen its behavior for the next year, defection
FIG. 4. Simulated temporal trend in mean animal probability of encounter over a selection of different management scenarios
(a) open access, (b) tax, (c) tax and subsidy, (d) cap, (e) cap-and-trade and combinations of parameters (indicated by the different
line types within each plot).
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tended to prevail. The environment did not change the
outcome of this scenario.
There was some stochasticity in the outcome of these
simulations: the higher the initial proportion of defec-
tors, the lower the chance that this management regime
led to the spread of cooperation. Interestingly, even in
those cases where defection prevailed on cooperation,
the industry never led to a complete collapse of the
wildlife population. Because some operators were forced
to liquidate their quotas as a result of the resource
decline, fewer operators were left in the market. Their
impact on the population could not grow indeﬁnitely,
even though they did not respect their allocated quotas.
Consequently, after an initial decline the population
started recovering, unaffected by the few interactions
with surviving tourism (Fig. 4e). This is contingent to
the assumption that operators did not invest in
infrastructure that could, for instance, allow for more
and longer trips.
DISCUSSION
Unregulated wildlife tourism has the potential to
cause long-term population consequences on animal
populations (Boyle and Samson 1985), leading to both
conservation concerns and long-term unproﬁtability of
the industry (Reynolds and Braithwaite 2001). This
resource system presents a series of peculiarities,
including that subtractability only arises on the long-
term, resource units (i.e., the animals) are not directly
subtracted but impacts act at a resource-system level,
and ownership of resource units is hardly possible.
However, targeted populations that become overexploit-
ed by tourism can and should be treated as common-
pool resources and managed accordingly (Briassoulis
2002, Moore and Rodger 2010). Using a simulation
approach, we tested the outcomes of different manage-
ment regimes both in terms of the wealth of the industry
and the survival of the natural resource. We investigated
the sensitivity of such regimes to various realistic
uncertainties in management implementation and in
our knowledge of the population.
Every regime we have evaluated has the potential to
work. Regardless of enforcement mechanisms, if pun-
ishments and rewards for defection and cooperation
were carefully planned, if we had perfect knowledge of
population dynamics and of its resilience to disturbance,
and if regulation was enforced without mistakes, the
population could survive and grow, and the industry
thrive as a consequence. Unfortunately, these conditions
are rarely encountered in the real world (Ostrom 1990).
First, it is generally hard to assess the amount of
disturbance that the population can take before showing
some sign of decline. Typically, an incorrect estimation
could result from a biased abundance estimate (Buck-
land et al. 2004) or from a misinformed link between the
observable short-term effects of tourism on the animals
and the long-term population-level consequences (Gill et
al. 2001). We showed here that a perfect management
scheme is resilient to an overestimation of such limit by
30%, which, for example, could accommodate the error
of an abundance estimate with standard precision (e.g.,
Taylor et al. 2007). However, management implemen-
PLATE 1. Dolphin watching in the southeastern United States. Photo credit: D. Lusseau.
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tation is also generally far from perfect, especially when
this is carried out by a central institution that the
operators perceive as a remote entity (Ostrom 1990).
Our simulations showed that even small errors in
imposing ﬁnes (in this case, an underestimation of time
above the limit of less than 3 minutes/day on average per
operator) could lead to the collapse of the system for a
large initial proportion of defectors. A cap management
scheme was also only resilient to small errors. Given the
levels of unreported or misreported harvest in other
industries targeting natural resources (Yablokov 1994,
Watson and Pauly 2001, Pitcher et al. 2002, Gavin et al.
2010), aiming at such high monitoring accuracy is
unrealistic (Keane et al. 2008). A tax and subsidy
approach offered a more robust scheme where operators
contributed to enforcement and received a reward if they
cooperated. Despite these improvements, large errors in
management (which could play a role, for example, in
remote, hard to monitor locations) combined with high
initial proportion of defecting operators were still
leading to overexploitation and industry collapse.
Generally, our results showed that errors in manage-
ment had a stronger inﬂuence on the outcome of a
scenario than the initial attitude of the agents, so that
scenarios with poor management were expected to fail
even if the initial number of defectors was low. The
inefﬁcacy and unfairness of the management in place
might themselves promote defective behaviors (Ostrom
1990). On the other hand, some simulations led to a
positive outcome by chance (i.e., defection stochastically
disappearing from the system). In the real world,
defective operators could also leave the industry for
reasons other than proﬁt. While defection could
reappear in a real system, this result emphasizes the
need to treat single case studies with caution.
In our simulations, defecting operators would cause
the failure of the industry before the complete depletion
of the exploited resource. In those scenarios where they
could retire, the wildlife population was then able to
recover.
Environmental variability can alter the proﬁtability of
the industry (Briassoulis 2002). In our simulations, large
heterogeneity caused different operators to perform
differently. In an extreme case, resource heterogeneity
could make portions of the population’s range unprof-
itable from a business perspective. Although this was
not implemented in our simulations, such heterogeneity
could concentrate the pressure of the industry on smaller
areas, possibly causing the displacement of the animals
to other, undisturbed areas (Lusseau 2005, Bejder et al.
2006). We also found that the basal encounter rate was,
as expected, very important in guaranteeing a sufﬁcient
customer satisfaction. Quick and unpredictable changes
in the spatial dynamics of the animals, which might
happen for example if the population’s range is much
wider than the area covered by tourism, can therefore
lead to sudden drops in customer satisfaction and to a
rapid decline of the industry (Briassoulis 2002). Low
availability or predictability of a wildlife resource may,
in a real world, contribute to support defecting
behavior, since operators have lower beneﬁts at stake.
We found that local knowledge (as opposed to
complete information) had the potential to stabilize
these dynamics. The structure it introduced in the
operators’ network promoted the retention of coopera-
tion. Even in the absence of any form of management,
restricted access to information about the behavior of
others could sustain a proﬁtable industry while main-
taining a growing wildlife population. This result
conﬁrmed previous work showing that any form of
structure in the interactions between the different
players can lead to cooperation ﬁxation in populations
(Ohtsuki et al. 2006).
The privatization of natural resources has been
repeatedly proposed as a solution to the inevitable
issues associated with the implementation of external
regulation (e.g., Smith 1981), although it can raise
ethical concerns (Luck et al. 2012). Tradable quotas of a
resource that different agents can buy and sell per-
formed successfully in some contexts (Costello et al.
2008). Individual transferable quotas are proposed to
increase stewardship incentives because they guarantee
long-term ﬁnancial beneﬁt from harvesting a resource
sustainably. While empirical evidence supports this
system in some cases, the mechanism by which it
operates is unclear. Overexploiting a resource while
others respect their owned quota still leads to greater
beneﬁts for the defector. Therefore, it is still unclear
what might prevent an operator from free-riding
(Parslow 2010). Privatizing wild animals is an unrealistic
solution, but here we explored how the system would
perform if quotas of the total amount of time available
with the animals could be traded between operators.
Our results suggest that the trade itself might offer a
proximate explanation to the success of this regime. In
our simulations, tradable quotas promoted cooperation
by increasing an operator’s payoff in a given year
without the need for him to defect. They allowed
operators to make money in the short term. This
prevented them from defecting since, at a given time,
defection was less convenient than selling part of the
quota when proﬁt started to decline. In a real world,
operators are also likely to prefer a guaranteed income
resulting from selling their shares to the risks associated
with defection. Crucially, this system holds only when
the value of the quota is evaluated fairly, and a sale
compensates for future potential proﬁts. Also, the
decision to defect must take into account the income
derived from the sales, i.e., trade has to happen before
an operator choose its behavior for the following year,
otherwise it does not provide any perceived beneﬁt and
does not favor cooperation. In more complex micro-
economic models, the proﬁt surplus generated by the
sale could be invested in infrastructure. These capital
investments can then protect proﬁt for the future, and
therefore act as what others deﬁned as stewardship
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incentives. Nevertheless, it should be noted that, at
times, our simulations would stochastically lead to the
spread of defection, the exclusion of cooperating
operators from the industry, and the conﬁnement of
the population into a depleted stable state. This would
likely deteriorate to the population’s collapse in a real-
world scenario, where successful operators would invest
on enlarging their business. Also, our model did not
treat the fair allocation of initial quotas, which is known
to be a critical issue in certain cases (Ostrom et al. 1999).
Successful management schemes and institutions
Our results showed that no single management
scheme could consistently support the spread of
cooperative behavior, the development of a proﬁtable
industry and the survival of the targeted population. It
has been suggested that successful governance should
rely on a combination of different management arrange-
ments (Dietz et al. 2003). When using a simple
combination of the two most successful regimes (tax
and subsidy and cap and trade) as an exploratory
exercise, we indeed found that for high management
errors and high initial proportion of defectors (i.e., when
the tax and subsidy regime tended to fail), the operators
remaining in the market maintained a proﬁtable
business without depleting the wildlife population.
Moreover, such combination stabilized the spread of
cooperation, which appeared to stochastically fail when
a market regime based on individual transferrable
quotas was in use (Appendix F: Fig. F1). Therefore, in
these conditions it emerges that each regime is able to
take over when the other regime would drive the system
in a disadvantageous state, improving management
performance. Such combined management is likely to
become even more robust if it is implemented on a small
scale, where local knowledge could promote the
development of strong pockets of cooperators (Appen-
dix D: Fig. D1). In the real world, small-scale
management will also be easier to enforce and will
increase the role of social capital in determining
behavior (Dietz et al. 2003).
We have explored the strengths and weaknesses of
various policy instruments. The next step would be to
identify the best institutional arrangements that could
facilitate the implementation of such management
measures. Given the nature of the resource units (i.e.,
wild, free-ranging animals), it is likely that ownership of
such units will remain impossible and undesirable, and
any institution should instead regulate the distribution
of quotas of time to spend with the animals. The
enforcement of taxes and ﬁnes by a central institution is
likely to suffer from substantial errors (Ostrom 1990),
while a form of self government (e.g., a cooperative of
tour operators acting locally) could successfully imple-
ment a tax and subsidy scenario. This is also expected to
be reinforced by the operators’ greater sense of
ownership and responsibility, and by personal and
societal values that come into play when people interact
more closely (Ostrom 1990, Ostrom et al. 1999). The
privately hired enforcers will also likely be more efﬁcient
at monitoring defection than a central public institution
(Ostrom 1990), and the users will be incentivized to
support rule enforcement (Dietz et al. 2003). This would
decrease errors, increasing the propensity for sustain-
ability. In order to stabilize these dynamics, the
operators could autonomously institute an agreement
where shares of the time quota can be traded, in order to
proﬁt from the strengths of a cap-and-trade regime.
Limitations and assumptions
While our economic model for the tourism industry
and our model for the exploitation of the natural
resource were both simple, we focused our attention on
investigating the complex connection between the two,
which has previously received little attention. Our
model, like all models, is a simpliﬁcation of reality and
involves some assumptions about the system. For
example, we assumed that the effect of disturbance
was distributed homogeneously across the grid, while
there is evidence that wildlife tourism can have local
consequences, which then cause spatial rearrangements
of the animals (Bejder et al. 2006). Similarly, while we
considered the effects of a spatially heterogeneous
distribution of the animals, we did not investigate what
would happen if the operators could know where the
animals were, retain and improve such knowledge over
time, and share it with other operators. In a real-world
scenario, animal distribution is likely to be non-
homogeneous, causing a varying proﬁtability of differ-
ent areas, which might also change in time (Bennett et
al. 2009). Therefore, operators’ movement patterns
would likely become directed toward areas with higher
probability of encountering the animals, potentially
increasing the impact on the population and altering
operators’ interactions and income. This and other
components of stochasticity we have introduced in our
simulation do not reﬂect actual stochastic elements in
the system, but rather our lack of knowledge about its
real socioecological dynamics, with unknown implica-
tions on the outcome of our simulations. It is likely that
these elements will also differ on a case-by-case basis.
Future work could reduce such uncertainty by param-
eterizing these processes using real-world observations
and explore how the diversity of processes inﬂuences
outcomes. Moreover, we excluded natural variability in
the population’s growth rate, as well as the presence of
other human stressors that might act synergistically with
tourism and alter the outcome of such interactions
(MacDonald 2000). We argue that these are necessary
simpliﬁcations of the natural component of the system
to pinpoint the sensitivities of different management
scenarios in the absence of confounding factors. In
addition, we did not consider any factor affecting
tourists’ numbers other than their satisfaction from the
trips. For example, cooperating operators may be
rewarded with a ‘‘green label,’’ which, in our simulation,
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could increase tourists’ satisfaction irrespective of the
amount of time spent with animals. It is easy to see how
such modiﬁcation would make any management sce-
nario more robust to errors and promote cooperation.
On the other hand, a reduction in overall tourism in an
area would probably push the operators toward
defection, in order to compensate for lower numbers
with higher satisfaction. Moreover, in the cap-and-trade
scenario, we did not allow the price of the time quotas to
vary as the result of supply and demand. Finally, we did
not account for the inﬂuence of societal, moral, and
personal values in operator behavior, and assumed that
they made rational decisions based exclusively on their
expected proﬁts. Any effect of these additional aspects
on the management outcome should be formally
analyzed in the future, but will also be highly context-
dependent (Agrawal 2001). Moreover, we expect these
values to be reinforced by successful management and
become less inﬂuential under unfair management.
Implications for the development of tourism management
scenarios
We showed that a wildlife population overexploited
by tourism should be viewed as a common-pool
resource. We can use simulations to assess the potential
outcomes of its management to disentangle the complex
interactions of several confounding factors that affect
the socio-ecological outcomes. Our simulations offer a
predictive platform that could be adapted to speciﬁc
case studies. The model could be parameterized to
mimic local conditions and provide a test-bed for
experimenting different governance solutions when such
experimentation is not possible in the real world. We can
conclude that we cannot ignore the sensitivity of the
outcome of different management scenarios to various
uncertainties associated with the success of the imple-
mentation of regulation. These should be realistically
taken into account when selecting a speciﬁc strategy in a
given context, in order to avoid the onset of the tragedy
of the commons. Scenarios where time quotas were
enforced using a tax and subsidy approach, or were
traded between operators appeared to be more robust
than other forms of management. We suggest that a
mixed strategy where the elements of strength from these
regimes are combined (possibly on a small spatial scale
and under the control of an association of cooperating
operators for their mutual beneﬁts) might offer an
effective and sustainable solution (Dietz et al. 2003).
Interestingly, the success of these scenarios emerged
under simple rational decision assumptions and did not
require questioning of the assumption that individuals
might be ‘‘selﬁsh, norm-free, and maximizers of short-
run results’’ (Ostrom et al. 1999). However, complex
context dependencies are likely to characterize real-
world systems and should caution from considering
these solutions as panaceas (Ostrom et al. 2007).
Empirical observations are now needed to tune our
general model to account for these more complex local
factors.
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